A few weeks ago, I had a brief e-mail exchange with Preston Sprinkle. I had sent him a copy of my book, Scripture, Ethics, and the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships, with a note saying that even though we disagree I appreciate his civil engagement on the subject. He replied saying he had already ordered the book and would write a review. That review is now live. It was gratifying to read a critique from a scholar who made a sincere effort to grapple with what I said. That kind of courtesy is rare in this conversation. So, I thank him for that. It makes the dialogue enjoyable. With that, here is my response:
Are Traditionalists and Progressives at a Stalemate?
In my book I state that the debate on same-sex relationships is stuck at a major disagreement on complementarity. Traditionalists, drawing on Genesis (but not exclusively), believe same-sex relations are universally prohibited on the premise that sexual differentiation is God’s created design for marriage. Progressives acknowledge sexual differentiation in Genesis for procreation, but argue that covenant fidelity is the foundation of biblical marriage. Procreation is not required to make a marriage valid.
Preston objects, saying that sexual differentiation is required alongside covenant fidelity. He claims the progressive argument “never refutes” the necessity of sexual differentiation, therefore, the debate is not at a stalemate. But, this logic is faulty. If there was successful refutation, there would be no impasse. Evidently, Preston believes he has won the argument and so there is no stalemate. But progressives equally claim that he has not made his case. Neither side accepts the other’s reasoning on complementarity. Thus, the stalemate.
Preston suggests that because, in his view, the progressive argument does not refute his position on sexual differentiation, my later arguments are compromised: “Karen’s later arguments for same-sex marriage [legal deliberation] can only work if she can prove this foundational argument to be true, that ‘covenant fidelity’ and ‘not sex differentiation, is the foundation of biblical marriage.’”
But, this misunderstands what I am doing in my book. My later arguments on legal deliberation do not build on the chapter concerning complementarity and thus are not dependent on it. I approach the debate from different angles. There are different ways to read the Bible and extrapolate ethics from it. I am providing more than one method to consider. The progressive arguments in chapter 3 on complementarity are both exegetical and theological. Exegetically, progressives see in Genesis that sexual differentiation is for the purpose of procreation. They may not conclusively refute sexual differentiation as prescriptive, but they provide reasonable counter proposals that Genesis is descriptive rather than prescriptive.
Chapter 3 especially relies on an interpretive approach that draws from broader theological principles to make a case, similar to the way abolitionists extrapolated ethics from Scripture concerning slavery. The Bible never fully condemns or outlaws slavery. William Webb argues that Scripture presents a trajectory away from slavery even if that movement is not completed within Scripture itself. Yet, one of my seminary professors warned our class against Webb’s book because it goes beyond what Scripture says. While I disagree with my former prof’s hermeneutics, he’s correct that Webb goes beyond what Scripture says. To this day, you can make a strong exegetical case for slavery from Scripture. The abolitionists had to appeal to broader theological themes in the Bible. They had to extrapolate to get around the obvious permission for slavery. A great resource illustrating this reality is Mark Noll’s book The Civil War as a Theological Crisis.
In other words, just because you can make a clear case for something from Scripture doesn’t automatically make it right. There’s more to applying ethics from Scripture than that. The abolitionists discerned the heart of God, but exegetically, they were in a much weaker position than slave owners. The abolitionists had to appeal to broader theological concepts in the Bible to make their case. In the same way, just because you can make a clear case against same-sex relationships from Scripture doesn’t automatically make it right (or that it’s the only thing Scripture has to say on the topic). I believe it’s necessary to examine the broader theological meaning of the biblical sex laws and marriage. Significantly, covenant represents the foundation of biblical marriage. Sexual differentiation is secondary and tied to “Be fruitful and multiply.” Procreation is not required for marriage and therefore is not essential in the same way as covenant.
To summarize, traditionalists and progressives do not agree on how to understand complementarity in light of Scripture. They are at a stalemate on the matter. In my later chapters on legal deliberation, I argue that even if sexual differentiation is a creation ordinance (per Preston), that does not end the conversation on the moral acceptability of same-sex relationships (more on that later in this post).
What do Traditionalists and Progressives Agree On?
In my book I state that traditionalists and progressives largely agree that same-sex relations in antiquity were exploitative. Preston objects saying: “Traditionalists and progressives are not on the same page about the meaning and interpretation of the prohibition passages. While most progressives say that the prohibition passages don’t apply to modern day, consensual, same-sex relationships between adults, the historically Christian view says that they do apply.”
This objection seems to be based on a misunderstanding, likely attributable to my concise writing (I use subtle qualifiers like “largely” or “primarily”). To clarify, I don’t deny that traditionalists believe the prohibitions address more than exploitative practices, particularly based on the apparent mutuality in Leviticus 20 (both parties condemned) and Romans 1 (mutual passion). That’s why I spend a chapter discussing complementarity, including Romans 1. Of course, we can’t say for certain what kind of mutuality is indicated. For example, a consensual encounter with a prostitute might fit the biblical authors’ understanding. But for the sake of argument, I do engage traditionalists’ belief that the prohibitions are not confined to exploitation (see chapter 3).
Preston might like me to add that traditionalists point to peer same-sex relations in antiquity, alongside Scriptural suggestions of mutuality. I do mention in my book that peer relations existed and were “rare,” which is what Preston also believes. But we can’t prove that Paul or other biblical authors knew monogamous, covenanted same-sex couples. For all we know their primary exposure was to the predominant exploitative practices. Neither traditionalists nor progressives can make a case on this basis alone. It remains speculative. That is why I focus on the Scriptural basis for mutuality.
I stand by the assertion that traditionalists and progressives agree on a lot. You won’t find a reputable scholar, traditionalist or progressive, who will deny that monogamous, life-long, peer same-sex relationships were not the norm in antiquity. Exploitative practices were predominant. For example, Preston writes in his book, People to Be Loved, “We do have some evidence of ‘peer’ same-sex relations, but these seem to be rare. For the most part, same-sex relations followed the dominant versus dominated social paradigm” (56). He titles the chapter on the socio-cultural context “Rated R.” When reading about sexual practices in the Greco-Roman world he felt like he needed to “scrub [his] eyes with soap” (57). He writes, “Most same-sex erotic relations in the Greco-Roman world exhibited some sort of power differential. That is, there was the dominant partner and the dominated partner, the master and the slave, the man and the boy, the guy seeking homosexual sex and the male prostitute who gives it to him for a price” (61).
It’s helpful to note where there is agreement because many progressives believe that traditionalists don’t fully realize the exploitative context, and if only they did, then the argument could be won. But that is not the case. Traditionalists do know the exploitative context, but are still not persuaded. As I write in my book, traditionalists believe the biblical authors are “concerned not only with exploitation, excessive lust, and patriarchal customs but also with physical complementarity” (Keen, 20). So my point in naming the agreement is to distill the debate to where the primary disagreement lies: complementarity.
How Important Is Sex Difference for Defining Marriage?
Preston states that I need to show that sexual differentiation does not define marriage. That the argument hinges entirely on this. I agree that the biblical authors understood marriage to be male-female. Though, we might question how much of their view was related to historical-cultural context and pre-scientific conclusions. For example, their views on cosmology are pre-scientific.
I am also concerned that Preston uses Genesis 1-2 in a prooftexting kind way, hyper-focusing on the description of male and female in the creation story, while overlooking other important biblical values that speak into the ethical dilemma. Notably, the biblical authors are virtually silent about Adam and Eve in all the other books of the Old Testament. They don’t use complementarity arguments when referring to homoeroticism. In fact, there is no prohibition against female-female same-sex relations in the Old Testament. If complementarity was the concern, why don’t they mention Adam and Eve? Why the unilateral fixation on males?
But even if we accept Preston’s insistence that sexual differentiation must be included in the definition of marriage, this does not preclude a deliberative process. Let’s look at divorce as an example. Jesus clearly indicates that permanency of marriage is a creation ordinance (Mark 10). Divorce is contrary to God’s created order and design for marriage (no matter what Moses allowed). According to Jesus, the definition of marriage itself must include permanency. But, that did not stop the biblical authors from engaging in a deliberative process on divorce. If we were to follow Preston’s logic, we would have to argue that Paul cannot make exceptions to divorce until he proves that permanency does not define marriage.
One also has to consider that if God allowed Moses to grant divorce as an accommodation (and include it in Scripture), that leaves open the possibility that God allows accommodations. Although, I think we can go further and assert moral acceptability on the basis of a deliberative process.
What about Legal Deliberation?
Preston seems to acknowledge the deliberative process in Scripture, but questions whether it can be applied to same-sex relations: “[W]e know there are tensions about whether divorce is ever permissible . . . The relevant question is: do we see similar tensions with same-sex sexual relations? The answer is no.”
There are a couple assumptions being made. First that tensions must be evident to permit a deliberative process. But that assumption has yet to be proven. Take for example, the legal revision of slavery laws in Exodus by the author of Deuteronomy. The original law purportedly came from God on Mt. Sinai and there are no obvious tensions that appear to have precipitated the Deuteronomist’s progressive revision.
Second, Preston assumes there are no scriptural tensions that apply to same-sex relations. Yet such tensions are evident in Paul’s concerns about sexual ethics broadly. The tension is evident when he says “If they cannot control themselves, they should marry” (1 Cor 7:9). Paul, in contrast to Greco-Roman culture, was concerned about sexual monogamy and reducing promiscuity. But Scripture does not address the ethical dilemma of a gay person who “cannot control themselves.” Thus, a tension exists between the prohibition against same-sex relations and Paul’s acknowledgment that some cannot control themselves. Not everyone can achieve life-long celibacy.
What are the Bible’s Sexual Laws Really About?
Preston agrees that the purpose of biblical law is creating a good and just world. But he says, “[W]hat kind of sexual behavior is part of the good and just world that God envisions? . . . Is sex difference no longer relevant for the institution of marriage in the good and just world that (the first-century Jewish) Jesus sought to create?”
Preston needs to do more here to explain how sexual differentiation in marriage is so crucial to a good and just world that it demands requiring a minority group to endure mandatory life-long celibacy. No one is denying that sexual differentiation is good (at least I am not). Rather, how do we create a good and just world for people with a different biological sexual development?
Is Life-Long Celibacy Possible for Everyone?
On this question, Preston states: “[C]elibacy forms a very important pastoral argument. It’s just not an ethical one. From a pastoral vantage point, Karen raises a very good point about how realistic lifelong celibacy given our cultural climate.”
I find the split between “pastoral” and “ethical” to be odd. The deliberative process is a good example of how these work together. For example, the PCA encountered a pastoral dilemma of women battered by their husbands. They engaged in a deliberative process that concluded that women subjected to unremedied domestic violence can lawfully divorce and remarry. No such exception is stated in Scripture. But they used biblical casuistry to address the pastoral situation. I am doubtful that there is any pastoral situation that is not also ethical.
Preston seems to acknowledge that life-long celibacy is not realistic. He attributes this to our cultural climate, but this is demonstrably false. Throughout history many Christian theologians have said life-long celibacy is not possible, and I quote them in my book. So, to blame our modern cultural climate as though difficulty with celibacy is some new phenomenon is not truthful.
Preston states: “The New Testament definitely does not say that marriage and sex are necessary for human flourishing.” Setting aside Genesis’s assertion that “It’s not good for the human being to be alone,” the New Testament does say marriage is necessary for some people to achieve holiness. So Paul tells married people not to deprive each other lest they fall into immorality, and he counsels people with strong passions to marry lest they engage in sex apart from covenant. Paul does see marriage as necessary for those who cannot control themselves.
Preston doesn’t adequately address the fact that life-long celibacy is unrealistic for every person. He makes comparisons with teens who struggle with porn as if that is equivalent. He seems to suggest that gay and lesbian people who cannot be celibate should just try harder and continue to fail and repent throughout their lives. But that approach does not foster holiness or well-being. In fact, it leads to much dysfunction and promiscuity. The same can’t be said for use of porn (which is wrong for its exploitation, by the way). Continual use of porn usually leads to more dysfunction and difficulty having a normal relationship. In contrast, a monogamous, life-long committed relationship creates stability for gay and lesbian people.
Final Thoughts
Preston makes a series of assertions at the end of his review that seem to lose the careful engagement exhibited in most of the review. Perhaps fatigue at the end of a long post. For example, Preston states: “Paul isn’t at all saying that if a sexually pure life is too difficult then by all means pursue a relationship that best fits your innate sexual desire, since we all know you’re going to have sex anyway.”
This is a serious trivialization of my argument. I am not arguing that life-long celibacy is “too difficult” as if it’s just a matter of sucking it up and trying harder. Nor am I suggesting anything goes. I am taking seriously Paul’s acknowledgement that not everyone can “control themselves.” I am taking seriously Christian theologians throughout history who have acknowledged that life-long celibacy is not just too hard, but not possible for everyone. And I am making an argument that advances holiness. It is better for gay people to commit to monogamy rather than flounder in serial broken relationships (which results from unsuccessful efforts at prolonged chastity).
Preston also concludes: “We can’t just highlight a few laws that show clear signs of discontinuity in order to show that the same can be said of other ethical teachings. That’s not how we do Christian ethics. We can’t, for instance, say that there’s discontinuity in the dietary laws and therefore I don’t think we need to care for the poor anymore, even though the Old Testament says we should. We have to evaluate each ethical command on its own.”
This paragraph is not a coherent response to my book. I don’t make an argument about discontinuities. I make an argument for a deliberative process as a hermeneutical principle in Scripture. At the end of this paragraph Preston says, “We have to evaluate each ethical command on its own.” That is precisely what I argue in my book! Moreover, the example he gives of discontinuity in dietary laws leading to a conclusion not to care for the poor doesn’t even make sense. I am not arguing for random, arbitrary discontinuities. I am arguing for a deliberative process for mandates that is based on scriptural precedence and rationale, namely, consideration of human need. I agree that the strange scenario Preston has set up in this paragraph is “not how we do Christian ethics.” It’s not how I do ethics nor what I suggest in my book.
Note: Preston responded to this post, and I offered an additional reply. Click here to continue reading our dialogue.
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Addendum
1. Preston doesn’t engage with my fourth key argument which he describes as “about the biological nature of same-sex orientation.” That is not an accurate description. My fourth argument is a theological one pertaining to the fall and how we conceptualize same-sex attraction–whether moral fallenness, natural fallenness, or human variation. This does matter for how we think through a theology of ethics.
2. Preston expressed concern that I misrepresented him on sexual orientation change efforts. He states: “Karen and I have many differences, but our view of sexual orientation change efforts is pretty much the same.” That is, he finds reparative therapy problematic and apparently recognizes that rates of sexual orientation change are low. I am glad to hear that he does not, apparently, promote sexual orientation change efforts. I certainly don’t want to misrepresent him. He notes that he spends 7 pages talking about celibacy. However, I believe the way he presents information in his book, People to Be Loved, can give the impression he is promoting change or mixed orientation marriage (6 pages).
He starts off his discussion by saying: “So what are the options for nonaffirming same-sex attracted Christians? For the most part, there are three” (157). He then proceeds to discuss reparative therapy, mixed orientation marriage, and celibacy–in that order. The ordering made me assume he was suggesting “try this first, then this, and here is celibacy last.” But maybe Preston did not intend for it to be read that way. In any case, he begins his discussion of reparative therapy acknowledging the short-comings of the ex-gay movement and “older” treatments of reparative therapy, but then says “Still, there are some people who say they have been blessed by reparative therapy, even though their voices are often muzzled and mocked by the tidal wave of opposition both inside and outside the church” (159). He then spends several paragraphs talking about his anonymous psychologist friend with a Ph.D. who claims a 50 percent change rate for his clients. I don’t see how it’s possible to read Preston’s discussion without coming away with the impression that he considers reparative therapy a decent option to consider. That said, he does offer qualifiers about expectations of change and the importance of being realistic that it might not happen.
Preston then goes on to the next point: “The second option for a same-sex attracted Christian is to pursue a mixed orientation (MO) marriage” (162). I have seen Preston make positive statements about mixed orientation marriage elsewhere, suggesting that, yes, you may be gay but it’s possible to be attracted to one person of the opposite sex. I am troubled by this, not because some MO marriages can’t work, but because it often doesn’t work. It’s basically the same kind of holy grail that the ex-gay movement dangled before gay folk. In the ex-gay movement it was “You can change your sexual orientation and get married.” Preston is saying “You can become attracted to one person of the opposite sex and marry.” My concern is that conservatives use the hope of reparative therapy and mixed orientation marriage to avoid dealing with hard questions around life-long celibacy.
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